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Agriculture (including allied activities) accounted for only 18 per cent of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP-at constant prices) in 2007-08 (Economic Survey 2008-09), but
it is a source of income and employment for more than two-thirds of the nation’s
population. The role of agricultural sector remains critical as it accounts for about 52 per
cent of the employment in the country, apart from being the provider of food for the
people, fodder for livestock and raw materials to industries. In fact, agricultural sector
contributed 12.2 per cent of national exports in 2007-08 (Economic Survey 2008-09).
Based on the fact that the relative contribution of agriculture to the GDP has been
declining over time, it could be stated that this sector has lost its importance as the
backbone of Indian Economy. Agriculture is now being seen by many as a sector of
"cows and poultry", and the crop husbandry as a dismal area. In general, the poor
performance of agricultural production and food production is not a healthy sign for the
economy. The recent trends in the agricultural sector of India need to be looked at in the
context of globalization process and its impact on Indian economy. The present paper is
an attempt in this direction.
The objective of this paper is to examine the issue of Agricultural Crisis in India, its root
cause, consequences of the crisis and to highlight the major suggestions for its
development. The entire discussion is organized in three sections. Section 1 examines
the recent trends in agriculture and the issue of agricultural crisis in India. Section 2
examines the root cause for the observed trends in agriculture in India and analyses the
consequences. The third section provides the summary.
2Section 1
Trends in Indian Agriculture and Its Crisis
Agriculture was considered to be the backbone of Indian economy and its contribution to
the National Income was estimated as about 57 per cent in the early fifties. This position
got altered steadily and significantly since independence (Table 1). In 2000/01, the
contribution of agriculture to GDP was halved again to about 26 per cent. In 2007-08,
it is estimated that agriculture contributes only 19.78 percent to the GDP. Though it is
expected that in the process of development the sectoral contribution to the GDP
would change, the issue is whether the observed trends in India’s agricultural sector’s
share over time is justifiable or desirable?
Table 1
Trends in Share of Agriculture and Allied Sectors in India’s GDP
Period 1950/51 1960/61 1970/71 1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 2005/06 2007/08
Percentage
Share 56.70 52.48 46.00 39.93 34.04 26.18 21.65 17.80
Source: Computed from Economic Survey: 2008-09.
It is interesting to note that the growth rates of agriculture in India’s GDP had been
growing during early periods, but in the last few years, it is constantly declining. This is
evident from the table 2, which presents the long-term growth rates of agriculture in
comparison with the whole economy.
The growth performance of agriculture has been always lower than that of the total
economy since the early independence period say pre-green revolution era (1951-52 to
1967-68). The divergence is the highest during the Tenth Plan Period where the total
economy was growing at 7.77 per cent, the agriculture and allied sector was witnessing a
growth of 2.47 per cent only. The growth rate of agriculture was relatively high during
the eighties and early nineties say 3.52 and 3.66 per cent respectively. However, during
the 9th Plan, the growth rate of agriculture dripped down to 2.50 and further to 2.47
during the 10th Plan Period.
3Table 2
Average GDP Growth Rates—Overall and in Agriculture in India
(% per Year at 1999–2000 Price)
Period TotalEconomy
Agriculture
and Allied
Sectors
Crops
and
Livestock
1. Pre-Green Revolution: 1951–52 to 1967–68 3.69 2.54 2.65
2. Green Revolution Period: 1968–69 to 1980–81 3.52 2.44 2.72
3. Wider Technology Dissemination Period
1981–82 to 1990–91
5.40 3.52 3.65
4. Early Reforms Period : 1991–92 to 1996–97 5.69 3.66 3.68
5. Ninth Plan Period: 1997–98 to 2001–02 5.52 2.50 2.49
6. Tenth Plan Period : 2002–03 to 2006–07 7.77 2.47 2.51
Source: 1. National Accounts Statistics 2008 (New Series), Central Statistical
Organization, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, New
Delhi.
2. Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–2012), Agriculture, Rural Development,
Industry, Services and Physical Infrastructure, Volume III, Planning
Commission, Government of India, 2008.
The deceleration in the economy and the agricultural sector during the Tenth Plan period
could be closely looked at, by examining the growth rates of GDP by its sectors. The
growth of GDP at factor cost (at constant 1999-2000 prices) was at 6.7 per cent in 2008-
09 representing a deceleration from a high growth of 9.0 per cent and 9.7 per cent in
2007-08 and 2006-07 respectively. The deceleration of growth in 2008-09 was spread
across all sectors except mining & quarrying and community, social and personal
services. The growth in agriculture and allied activities decelerated from 10 per cent in
2003-04 to 4.9 per cent in 2007-08 and further to 1.6 per cent in 2008- 09, mainly on
account of the high base effect of 2007- 08 and due to a fall in the production of non-food
crops including oilseeds, cotton, sugarcane and jute than in 2007-08 (Table 3).
4Table 3
Rate of Growth of GDP at Factor Cost at 1999-2000 Prices
(in per cent)
Sector 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Agriculture, forestry
& fishing 10.0 0.0 5.8 4.0 4.9 1.6
Mining & quarrying 3.1 8.2 4.9 8.8 3.3 3.6
Manufacturing 6.6 8.7 9.1 11.8 8.2 2.4
Electricity, gas &
water supply 4.8 7.9 5.1 5.3 5.3 3.4
Construction 12.0 16.1 16.2 11.8 10.1 7.2
Trade, hotels &
restaurants 10.1 7.7 10.3 10.4 10.1
Transport, storage &
communication 15.3 15.6 14.9 16.3 15.5
9.0*
Financing,
insurance, real estate
& business services
5.6 8.7 11.4 13.8 11.7 7.8
Community, social
& personal services 5.4 6.8 7.1 5.7 6.8 13.1
Total GDP at factor
cost 8.5 7.5 9.5 9.7 9.0 6.7
Source : Economic Survey :2008-09.
Note: * indicates that Trade, hotels & restaurants, transport & communication
(together) grew at 9 per cent, 2008-09.
The performance of agriculture by crop categories also clearly indicates the slowing
down process of agriculture in India (see Table 3). Though the onset of deceleration in
agriculture began from early nineties, it became sharp from the late nineties. The cereals
output was growing at the rate of 4 percent in the fifties and sixties, and thereafter it
recorded a steady decline and the growth rate was only 1.28 per cent during the 10th Plan
Period. The growth rates of pulses and oilseeds declined drastically during the 9th Plan,
but improved during the 10th Plan. The growth rates of fruits and vegetables output
showed a steady decline from early nineties.
5Table 3
Growth Rate in Output of Various Crop Categories of Agriculture
(Gross Value of Output at 1999–2000 Price)
Period Cereals
Pulses
and
Oilseeds
Fruits and
Vegetables
Other
Crops
All
Crops
1951–52 to 1967–68
(Pre-Green Revolution Period) 4.19 2.98 2.67 2.42 3.00
1968–69 to 1980–81
(Green Revolution Period) 3.43 0.97 4.82 2.98 3.00
1981–82 to 1990–91
(Wider Technology Dissemination Period) 3.52 5.41 2.84 1.71 2.97
1991–92 to 1996–97
(Early Reforms Period) 2.36 2.92 6.07 2.18 3.09
1997–98 to 2001–02
(Ninth Plan Period) 1.49 –1.43 4.11 3.82 2.25
2002–03 to 2006–07
(Tenth Plan Period) 1.28 4.29 2.97 3.58 2.46
Source: The same as for table 2.
Pulapre Balakrishnan, Ramesh Golait and Pankaj Kumar (2008) observed the slow
growth of the agricultural sector since 1991. The study documented the movement of the
factors that have been recognised as determining agricultural growth during this period
with a view to identify the proximate causes of the slowdown. The study revealed that the
factors responsible for slow growth are a stagnation of public investment for almost a
quarter of a century, a slowing of irrigation expansion since 1991 and a downscaling of
production due to farm fragmentation. The study argued that smaller farm holding-size,
by making it more difficult for the majority of Indian farms to access new technology,
and adopt more efficient forms of farm production organisation, may have adversely
affected agricultural growth.
The poor performance of agriculture could be attributed to a large number of factors such as
natural resource base (including rainfall), technology, infrastructure (including irrigation),
and the economic environment comprising price signals and institutions. The Steering Group
6for the Eleventh Plan identified technological change, public investment, and diversification
as the most important determinants of growth. The Steering Group analysis showed that
progress on technology and public investment slowed down from early 1990s. However, the
negative effect in growth was offset by private investment which improved during 1990–97.
As a result, growth continued to be relatively high in this period. However, terms of trade
turned against agriculture from 1999–2000 to 2004–05 and reduced profitability of farming
quite sharply (Table 4).
Table 4
Trends in Growth Rates of Area, Input Use, Credit and Capital Stock in
Agriculture —1980–81 to 2005–06
(% per Year)
Period I Period II Period III
Particulars 1980–81 to
1990–91
1990–91 to
1996–97
1996–97 to
2005–06
Technology# 3.3 2.81 0.00
Public sector net fixed capital stock 3.86 1.92 1.42*
Gross irrigated area 2.28 2.62 0.51*
Electricity consumed in agriculture 14.07 9.44 –0.53@
Area under fruits and vegetables 5.60 5.60 2.71@
Private sector net fixed capital stock 0.56 2.17 1.17*
Terms of trade 0.190 0.95 –1.69*
Total net fixed capital stock 2.00 2.06 1.28*
NPK use 8.17 2.45 2.30
Credit supply 3.72 7.51 14.37*
Total cropped area 0.43 0.43 –0.10
Net sown area –0.08 0.04 –0.22
Cropping intensity 0.51 0.39 0.12
Note: # Yield potential of new varieties released of paddy, rapeseed/mustard, groundnut,
wheat, maize, and cotton; * Upto 2003–04; @ Upto 2004–05.
Source: Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–2012), Agriculture, Rural Development,
Industry, Services and Physical Infrastructure, Volume III, Planning
Commission, Government of India, 2008.
The trends in the area, input use, capital stock and technology also reflect the agricultural
crisis and the farmer’s response accordingly. Though it is difficult to infer the cause and
7effect relationship based on the above data, the trend over time reveal the behaviour and/
or needs of cultivators and the changing cultivation practices in India. The Gross Cropped
Area(GCA) and Net Sown Area(NSA) showed a negative growth rate in the period III..
The cropping intensity had declined from 0.5 to 0.1 between the periods I and III. The
use of inputs such as fertilizers, electricity and irrigation (as measured by irrigated area),
technology and fixed stock had been declining during the reference periods.
The above trends clearly indicate the crisis in Indian agriculture. In this backdrop, we
shall discuss the root cause of agriculture crisis in India in the next section.
Section 2
The Root Cause and Consequences
The root cause of the crisis in agriculture is that agriculture is becoming an economically
unviable activity when compared to other enterprises. It means that the profitability of
agriculture is low or nil or negative, and therefore, the income derived from these
activities are not sufficient enough to meet the expenditure of the cultivators. The poor
farmer is squeezed between high input costs and low returns. The issue of viability
depends on numerous social, economic and cultural factors which would have substantial
subjective elements. It would also vary from crop to crop, time to time, region to region
and group to group as well. As farmers are considered to be rational in their decision
making, no wonder they give up crop cultivation and shift their occupation or keep
themselves unemployed instead incurring loss in doing agriculture. The land, the major
low-cost input of agriculture becoming a high-cost input as the opportunity cost of land
use becoming high. This factor must be playing a major role in reducing the land kept for
agriculture and converting the same for other enterprises and services, as land is a scare
factor of production.
The problem of income deficit in agriculture arises from three basic causes: first, adverse
terms of trade (which means farmers pay more in real exchange terms for the goods and
8services they buy than what they get for those that they sell); second, low productivity of
resources engaged in agriculture leading to low level of production, and third, the
excessive use (dependence) of inputs such as labour, fertilisers, pesticides, etc., causing
the cost of cultivation shooting up compared to that of the final sale value of the crop
output.
When agriculture is not yielding remunerative income the life of the farmers become very
desperate. As a first step, they alter their crop pattern by cultivating profit yielding crops
(commercial crops), provided if the land and climate are suitable for such shift. If the
problem persists, the smart farmers give up the agriculture activity and take up alternative
occupation and convert the land for alternative uses. Once the agricultural land is
converted for alternative uses, it becomes totally irreversible again for agriculture. As
such, decline in the agricultural land area sets the motion of crisis on, leading to the
situation of permanent crisis.
Though the root cause of agricultural crisis could be attributed to the real economics of
crop cultivation, several price and non-price factors have played major role for the
agricultural crisis in India. A few such factors are:
Dependence on Rainfall and Climate:
Unlike other sectors, agriculte depends largely on the natural climate includong rainfall.
Nearly 60% of India's farmers depend on rains for irrigation and a failed monsoon means
crops such as rice, wheat, soyabean, sugarcane and cotton take a severe hit. To protect the
fall in prices during times of harvest, the government has hiked the minimum support
price for paddy and pulses, and increase then time to time. These support prices are
beneficial to farmers, only if they could harvest the crop. If the crop failed due to adverse
climatic conditions and poor rainfall, the risk is more felt by the farmers. Though the
initiatives such as modern irrigation system and energisation of wells make agriculture
less dependent on monsoon, it can not completely do away with the nature and climate.
9Liberal Import of Agricultural Products:
The fall and fluctuations in the prices of agricultural products is directly related to the
liberalisation policy of the government. The policy of removal of quantitative restrictions
and lowering of import duties adopted in India were according to the agreements of the
World Trade Organisations (WTO). The main reason for the crash of prices of
agricultural products, especially of cash crops, in India was removal of all restrictions to
import these products. For example, when the Government of India reduced the import
duty on tea and coffee from Sri Lanka and Malaysia, their prices in the domestic market
got reduced drastically. Similarly, liberal policy of importing silk has affected the
domestic mulberry cultivators and silkworm rearers. Thus cultivation of such products
became unprofitable and so their production was fully or partly stopped.
Reduction in Agricultural Subsidies:
In order to encourage crop cultivation, the Government of India announced several
subsidies time to time. Providing subsidies were unavoidable as the cost of cultivation
was increasing and any modenisation required huge additional cost and burden for
cultivators. Moreover, to raise the output of agriculture and to improve the productivity
levels additional investment were encouraged upon. In the post-reform period, the
government reduced different types of subsidies to agriculture, and this has increased the
production cost of cultivation. No doubt that this move has adversely affected the
agricultural sector. It has increased the input cost and made agriculture less profitable.
Lack of Easy Credit to Agriculture and Dependence on Money Lenders:
In general, the lending pattern of commercial banks, including nationalised banks, to
agriculture is not simple. It is part of the policy of privatisation that banks, even
nationalised banks, look for profit over their social responsibilities to the people. This has
forced the farmers to rely on moneylenders and thus pushed up the expenditure on
agriculture. The National Commission for Agriculture, headed by Dr M.S. Swaminathan,
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also pointed out that removal of the lending facilities and concessions of banks during the
post-reform period have accelerated the crisis in agriculture (cited in Mathew
Aerthayil:2008). Low incomes on one side and relatively high consumption needs on the
other side squeeze the farmer into a situation of overdue payments and possible defaults
on loans. Under high cost conditions of cultivation based on modern technology, the crop
failures hurts the farmer’s equation very badly, causing difficulties in paying back their
loans and pushed into indebtedness. When the farmers were not able to pay back loan
with high interest, they fell into the debt trap, with suicides as a extreme response.
Studies show that most of the farmers’ suicides were due to the debt trap. Farmer suicide
is reported mainly from the high-tech agriculture belts, such as Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Punjab (Bhat and Vijaya Kumar: 2006). All these states have
embraced capital intensive and 'cutting edge' technology in the name of boosting
production. In areas where traditional agricultural practices and organic farming are
prevalent, such as Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, suicide is unheard of. Though
the government response has ranged from reducing or deferring interest, rescheduling,
extending, and twice in the last 20 years, waiving the overdues, these measures have
invariably acted as palliatives, with the problem recurring periodically and almost
predictably, with a greater magnitude each time. The crisis of indebtedness will recur,
because of basic structural factors specific to Indian agriculture.
Decline in Government Investment in the Agricultural Sector:
An unfortunate trend over the past two decades has been that expenditure control efforts
following fiscal shocks such as the Pay Commissions awards have led to cutbacks in
agricultural investment and extension. During the period between 1976–80 and 2001–03
public investments in agriculture declined from over 4% of agriculture GDP to 2%. Most
of the subsidies are on fertilizer, power, and irrigation water and these have actually
contributed to the degradation of natural resources. Further, a considerable amount of
Plan expenditure on agriculture is not on investment but on subsidies not accounted for in
the above list. Simplistic fiscal rules such as protecting Plan expenditures more than non-
Plan expenditures add to the problem (For details refer, Eleventh Plan Document).
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Decline in public investment on agriculture is based on the policy of minimum
intervention by the government enunciated by the policy of globalisation. The
expenditure of the government in rural development, including agriculture, irrigation,
flood control, village industry, energy and transport, declined from an average of 14.5 per
cent in 1986-1990 to six per cent in 1995-2000. When the economic reforms started, the
annual rate of growth of irrigated land was 2.62 per cent; later it got reduced to 0.5 per
cent in the post-reform period.
Conversion of Agricultural Land for Alternative Uses:
On the one hand, the demand on land for non-agricultural uses has been steadily
increasing. On the other hand, farmers are unable to cultivate any crop due to the
unviable nature of agriculture. This makes the conversion of cropland for non-
agricultural purposes easy and effective. In addition to the above fact, as part of the
economic reforms, the system of taking over land by the government for commercial and
industrial purposes was introduced in the country. As per the Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) Act of 2005, the government has notified more than 400 such zones in the country.
Since the SEZ deprives the farmers of their land and livelihood, it is harmful to
agriculture
The consequence of agricultural crisis in India is very vast and likely to hit all the other
sectors and the national economy in several ways.
As a first step, it affects the domestic food production significantly. This would lead to
import of foodgrains for large human population. This has an immediate effect on the
prices of agricultural commodities, rising up the cost of living. As the basic requirement
food becoming costlier for the mass, naturally it affects the health and nutrition of the
people badly and aggravates the poverty levels.
12
The crisis would displace huge laboureres and farmers from agricultural employment.
These displaced labour forces will have limited opportunities of getting alternative
employment and therefore, they would become unemployed and dependents. More
over, the fall out actions such as migration from rural to urban for want of jobs and
imbalance in the labour market would bring several social and economic set backs on the
economy.
As agriculture is not attractive to farmers, they discontinue their agricultural activities
and shift the land for no-agricultural uses. Though this will be of beneficial to other
growing sectors, it is pitiable that the fertile land that is suitable for cultivation are getting
converted for other activities. Once these lands are put into use for activities other than
cultivation, it is not possible to bring them back to agriculture. Thus, the land loss for
agriculture will be permanent and great. In this context, the agricultural crisis would be
also a permanent crisis and trap.
At the macro level, the decline in agricultural production would necessitate increase in
import of foodgrains. The dependence on food imports would drain the foreign exchange
and India thereafter will become a net importer of grains, capital, technology and money.
Section 3
Summary of findings
Agricultue in India is undergoing a structural change leading to a crisis situation. The rate
of growth of agricultural output is gradually declining in the recent years. The relative
contribution of agriculture to the GDP has been declining over time steadily. The
performance of agriculture by crop categories also clearly indicates the slowing down
process of agriculture in India. The onset of deceleration in agriculture began from early
nineties and it became sharp from the late nineties. The trends in the area, input use,
capital stock and technology also reflect the agricultural downfall and the farmer’s
response accordingly. It is alarming that India is moving towards a point of no return,
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from being a self-reliant nation of food surplus to a net importer of food. All these trends
indicate that the agricultural sector in India is facing a crisis today.
It is argued that the root cause of the crisis was that agriculture is no more a profitable
economic activity when compared to other enterprises. It means that the income derived
from these activities is not sufficient enough to meet the expenditure of the cultivators.
And therefore, unless agriculture is made a profitable enterprise, the present crisis cannot
be solved.
The related factors responsible for the crisis include: dependence on rainfall and climate,
liberal import of agricultural products, reduction in agricultural subsidies, lack of easy
credit to agriculture and dependence on money lenders, decline in government
investment in the agricultural sector and conversion of agricultural land for alternative
uses.
It is argued that the consequence of agricultural crisis in India is very vast and likely to
hit all the other sectors and the national economy in several ways. In specific, it has
adverse effects on food supply, prices of foodgrains, cost of living, health and nutrition,
poverty, employment, labour market, land loss from agriculture and foreign exchange
earnings. In sum, it revealed that the agricultural crisis would be affecting a majority of
the people in India and the economy as a whole in the long run. And therefore, it can be
argued that the crisis in agriculture is a crisis of the country as a whole.
Ihe only reamedy to the crisis is to do all that is possible to make agriculture a profitable
enterprise and attract the farmers to continue the crop production activities. As an effort
towards this direction, the government should augment its investment and expenditure in
the farm sector. Investment in agriculture and its allied sectors, including irrigation,
transport, communication, rural market, rural infrastructure and farm research, should be
drastically increased, and the government should aim at integrated development of the
rural areas. Implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme can also
become a means of revival of the rural economy.
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The rural economy, particularly agriculture, will be greatly benefited through
programmes meant for economically backward sections, including the Integrated Child
Development Schemes, Public Distribution System, Mid-day Meals Scheme for
schoolchilden, Rural Health Insurance and the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Schemes. All these programmes would increase the purchasing power of the rural people
and indirectly help agriculture itself.
The solution of the problem is not in a few “packages” but in drastic changes in the
present economic policies related to agriculture. No other sector’s growth and
development must be at the cost of agriculture. All farmers, agricultural labourers,
societies, Government and People’s Organisations should work collectively to revive
agriculture and “Save India from Agriculture Crisis”.
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